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L 
on a summer 
if 
" 
earlier in Tr., 1, L.13 -
several more beverages (Trial 
left and stated, ''I'm going to go get a 12-year-old" (Trial 
, P Ls.15-25). 
that day, KG., a 12-year-old who was wearing a two-piece 
was playing the Dixon by the arm and 
dragging her towards a dock on beach behind some bushes. (Trial TL, 
p ,Ls.21-23; pA2, 12 L.12; pA7, Ls.8-14.) Dixon told K.G. that he 
something to he would pay $100 if he could tell 
it was. (Trial TL, pA5, LsA-9.) K.G. asked several times to let her 
but Dixon would not do so. (Trial., p.52, Ls.3-11.) After they reached the 
Idaho Supreme Court 
reporter's transcripts 
convictions. (11/1 
Dixon's 
No. 33384, 
3 Order.) 
1 
take judicial notice of 
direct appeal of the 
mother of the 
1.) 
17 -
1-24.) ran 
Tr., 54, Ls.7-14.) 
Two bystanders observed some of interaction between Dixon 
sitting in Dixon's struggling to get and screaming 
help. 13 - p.105, p.119, - p.i ,L.9.) One of 
bystanders 
other young 
followed Dixon and watched approach and interact with 
(Trial Tr., p.123, L.i0 - 136, L.1.) Meanwhile, K.G. and 
mother notified police, and K. G. identified Dixon as perpetrator. (Trial Tr., 
16.) KG.'s mother p.56, L. 8- L.8; p.60, Ls.9-14; p.201, L.18 - p.203, 
confronted Dixon, and Dixon replied, "It's not fault your 12-year-old daughter 
was staring at me." (Trial Tr., p.83, L.25 - p.84, L.10.) After he was arrested and 
placed in a patrol car, Dixon kicked out the rear left window of the vehicle. (Trial 
Tr., p.216, L.25 - p.219, L.12.) Later at the jail, an officer found a marijuana pipe 
on Dixon's person. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.6 - p.267, L.i8.) 
The state charged Dixon with first-degree kidnapping, lewd conduct with a 
child under 16, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
misdemeanor injury to property. See State v. Dixon, 2007 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 494, Docket No. 33384 (Idaho App., June 26, 2007). After a trial, at which 
K.G. and the two bystanders testified and identified Dixon as the attacker (Trial 
Tr., p.57, Ls.9-12; p.102, L.19 - p.i03, L.5; p.120, Ls.i3-21), a jury found Dixon 
2 
1 
a 
in numerous 
(a present 
evidence and/or an arm - an 
which, Dixon asserts, rendered him incapable of committing kidnapping 
lewd conduct in the manner alleged by the state. (#39745 R, pp.1-5, 47-50; 
1/11 "Post Trial Briefing in Support of [Dixon's] Claim Of Post-Conviction 
(augmentation2).) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied 
petition. (#39745 R, pp.103-112; 1 0/10 Dixon filed an untimely 
n,H"Ire of appeal from the district court's denial of his post-conviction petition, and 
Idaho Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. (#39745 , pp.117-121.) 
Dixon then filed an LRC.P' 60(b) motion for relief from the district court's 
order denying post-conviction (10/5/11 motion (augmentation).) The 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Dixon's motion to augment the appellate 
record with his post-evidentiary hearing briefing, his I.RC.P. 60(b) motion, and an 
affidavit submitted in support that motion. (11/14/13 Order.) 
3 
an a 
ht 
district 
1 1 timely appealed. (#40761 R, pp.1 
Dixon next filed a successive post-conviction in 
asserted post-conviction was ineffective for to file a timely 
from the district court's of of 
pp.25-26, 
denying 
district court granted relief and re-entered 
post-conviction 
appeal. (#40761 ,p.49, 71-72.) 
Supreme Court No. in 
1 R, 
a 
appealed district court's denial of his post-conviction , with Case 
40761, in which Dixon appealed the district court's denial of his LRC.P. 60(b) 
motion. (9/23/13 Order.) The clerks' records from both cases are part of the 
consolidated appellate record. 
4 
in 
on as: 
1. 
3. to show that the district court abused its in 
I. P. motion? 
5 
!. 
Dixon contends district erred in denying his post-conviction 
claim that his cou was to object to jury trial being 
in a courtroom at Kootenai County Public Safety ing, a building in 
ich there is a county (Appellant's pp.7-17.) Dixon has failed 
show that his 
constitutionality 
a 
counsel was ineffective failing to challenge 
trial venue, where no controlling 
such a venue unconstitutional, and where authorities 
other jurisdictions have split on the question whether such a venue is 
constitutionally permissible. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. 
LC.R. 57(c); ==-.:~=, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A trial 
court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to 
great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct App. 
1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact 
and conciusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if 
they are ciearly erroneous, but will freely review the conciusions of law drawn by 
6 
9 
A 
137,774 (1 
unless it an of 
is a strong presumption that uct is within the wide range of 
reasonable professional Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); =~-'-'---'==, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 
(Ct. 1989). "[S]trategic or decisions will not second-guessed on 
appeal unless those are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
v. State, 145 Idaho 148,153-54,177 P.3d 362,367-68 (2008). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 
11 ( 1 988); -=-=:..:.~~-=-:=.:==- 1 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. 
7 
1 do 
1 
In a to 
a in the 
probability of success of motion in question In determining whether the 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance. 
Idaho 520,526, 927 P.2d 910,916 (Ct. App. 1996). Where 
=~.:..:.......:.:.....::::.=:::., 129 
alleged deficiency 
IS counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion the motion, if pursued, 
not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both 
of the test. 
Sixth provides that 
accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public 
all criminal prosecutions, 
, by an impartial jury." 
presumption of innocence is a basic component of a fair trial. Estelle v. Williams, 
425 U.S 501, 503 (1976). Practices such as shackling a defendant or requiring 
him wear prison garb during a jury trial have been held to pose such a threat to 
the "fairness of the factfinding process" that they must be subjected to "close 
judicial scrutiny." . Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-569 (1986). 
A few appellate courts have expanded upon these concepts and held that 
that a trial in a courtroom inside of a jailor prison is inherently prejudicial, and 
8 
a 
was 
an 
or 61 
a prison is 
, a case-by-case is required); ~== 
S. 532 1 cond 
in an administration building adjacent to prison, as opposed to prison itself, "was 
not inherently prejudicial"); see also :....:::::.=~:.:....:::~~= 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 63 (Cal. 
App. 2000) Uury trial conducted on but outside actual prison 
3 Other authorities have analyzed the question of a trial held within a 
correctional facility violates a defendant's to a public trial. See Bright v. 
875 P.2d 100, 109 (Alaska App. 1994); Vescusco v. Commonwealth, 360 
S.E.2d 547 (Va. App. 1987). While Dixon references this right to a public trial, 
and cites these cases in his Appellant's brief, he did not raise this issue before 
the district court in the course of the post-conviction proceedings. (See #39745 
R., pp.47-50; "Post Trial Briefing in Support [of Dixon's] Claim of Post-Conviction 
Relief (augmentation).) This Court should therefore consider this argument 
because Dixon failed to preserve it. State v. Fodge. 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 
P.2d 123, 126 (1992) ("The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not 
consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeaL") In any event, 
the record indicates that Dixon's jury trial was open to public. (See 12/10/10 
Tr., p.53, Ls.1 .) 
9 
in 
a 
was In a in 
Safety Building, a which houses the County Jail. (#39745 
R., p.88.) There have been numerous trials conducted in this courtroom, and as 
far as the district court was aware, there has never been an objection made to a 
trial being held there. (#39745 R., 90.) Aside from unsworn statements 
from Dixon's post-evidentiary briefing, record does not significant 
information regarding the organization and layout of the Kootenai County Public 
Safety , and the courtroom and Therefore, 
was no basis by which the court could conclude that the of Dixon's trial 
contained the same of prejudice were evident in 
=...:...:.=' and 
Cavan, and that the Kootenai County Public Safety Building courtroom was not 
instead more similar to the constitutionally permissible jury trial venues of Kell, 
Howard, and =..:.=..:..:..::::..4 
At the time of Dixon's trial, as is still the case currently, there was no 
controlling Idaho authority concerning the constitutionality of criminal jury trials 
being held in buiidings which also contain jails or prisons. As discussed above, 
even though there is support for the proposition that a jury trial conducted in a 
courtroom inside of a jailor prison may violate due process rights, Dixon has 
4 Of course, it is likely the district court was personally familiar with the Kootenai 
County Public Safety Building courtroom, having presided over numerous jury 
trials there. (#39745 R., p.90.) 
10 
to 
venue 
an objective 
R., pp. 
new trails on a novel 
Idaho venue 
had 
If Dixon's to 
then every other a in was 
ineffective as well. Further, .!...!..:=-.!.!.!..!.;=~:..:....::;=.:...:.;::., the only case cited by Dixon in 
his briefing below regard to this issue, could have known to Dixon's 
attorney because it was published four years after Dixon's 
Additionally, Dixon has failed to demonstrate prejudice that resulted from 
any deficiency. As court concluded, any motion to change the trial 
venue would have denied. (#39745 R., pp.105-106.) In making this 
determination, the district court was persuaded by two dissenting opinions in 
(ld.) In case, one of the dissenting opinions 
reasoned: 
According to the majority, James Frank Jaime's due process 
right to the presumption of innocence was violated when his trial 
was held in a permanent courtroom in the county jail building Gail 
building courtroom}. I cannot agree. i would that the practice of 
11 
on cases 
involving shackles and prison garb. While there is no doubt that it is 
inherently prejudicial to shackle a defendant during trial, or force a 
defendant to wear prison garb during trial, conducting a trial in a 
permanent courtroom in the jail building does not the same 
constitutional concerns. Shackling can of such a physical 
restraint as to deprive a defendant of the right to appear and defend 
himself or herself. Shackling is also a very visible that 
indicates to the jury defendant is so dangerous as to not 
trusted even by the judge. Similarly, a defendant who is forced to 
wear prison garb is distinctly marked as a dangerous or guilty 
person. 
But Jaime's entitlement "to the physical indicia of innocence" 
is ; it confers the defendant to be brought before 
the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a 
and innocent man," not to choose a particular courtroom. A 
courtroom is a location, not an accoutrement. Because a 
courtroom does not serve as an it does possess 
inherently prejudicial power a or a prison uniform. While 
some aspects of a court setting may cause prejudice in certain 
cases, there simply is no basis to conclude that the practice of 
conducting trials in a jail building courtroom is always and 
inherently prejudicial. 
Jaime, 233 P.3d at 872-876 (Fairhurst J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations 
omitted); see id. at 877-880 (Johnson J., dissenting) ("The majority 
contradicts the presumption of juror responsibility, intelligence, and honesty when 
it summarily concludes that 'the average juror would draw a[n] [improper] 
inference' about a defendant's guilt from the fact that trial was held in a jail 
courtroom."). Even had Dixon's counsel objected to the jury trial venue, such a 
motion would have been unsuccessful. 
Dixon has failed to show either that his trial counsel was deficient for 
failing to object to the trial venue, or that he was prejudiced by the lack of such 
12 
pp.1 that 
manner 
in 
failed to n.-",<:con'!' either any physical 
any potential expert might have testified to 
claim is thus entirely speculative, 
counsel was deficient, or that he was 
B. 
has 
his injury. Because his 
rlC'!"-"''!'O either that 
deficiency. 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on claim is based. 
LC.R. 
that the 
. Estes, 111 Idaho at, 436, 725 P.2d at 141. trial court's decision 
has not burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
117 at 792 at court conducts a 
13 
fact conclusions an appellate 
disturb are 
by district court those 
276-77,971 P.2d at 729-730. The credibility of the witnesses, the weight 
to be given to testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence 
are ail solely within the province of the district court. 139 Idaho 
at P.3d at 110. 
c. 
As above, an attorney's performance is not constitutionally 
unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there 
is a strong presumption that counsel's is wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson, 110 Idaho at 634, 718 P.2d at 286; 
Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will 
not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable 
of objective evaluation." Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d at 367-68. Trial 
counsel need not pursue ali potential assistance from experts. Harrington v. 
Richter, _ U.S. at _, 131 S.Ct. at 770,787-90 (2011) (counsel not ineffective 
for failing to procure forensic blood experts for trial). 
In this case, Dixon presented extensive trial testimony about his injury, 
how he suffered it, and how it impacted him. (Trial Tr., p.294, L.22 - p.300, L.17.) 
Dixon described, in detail, how he suffered a severe laceration to his left forearm 
14 
5-
L.1 ) scar 
(See no 
or testimony that 
trial. (See generally 12/10/10 .) Dixon 
thus failed to substantiate his claim. See -,-,-"..:::..:..:...=......::c.:..--=.::.::=' 145 Idaho 770-
711, 185 P.3d 921, 926-927 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding where a post-conviction 
to investigate call alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for 
certain witnesses, "[i]t is not enough to allege that a would have testified 
to certain events, or would have rebutted certain statements made at 
providing through affidavit, non hearsay evidence the substance 
witnesses' testimony" (citation omitted)). Dixon has failed to show that the 
court erred by denying his entirely speculative claim of attorney 
was 
at the evidentiary hearing, Dixon's 
decision not to seek the assistance of 
15 
counsel indicated that it 
witnesses. 
cou 
and retain 
was 
as soon as 
it 
"didn't want to wait." (ld.) 
he was prejudiced by 
nature of claim, 
his injury was so severe as to 
own testimony ind his 
the state's 
ificantly 
the of 
80 
L.2.) a firefighter/EMT 
scene that he did 
- 300, L 17.) G. 
the incident. (Trial Tr., 
actually examined Dixon's 
of or 
would indicate "some sort of trauma." (Trial Tr., p.251, 18 - p.252, 
by 
Additionally, Dixon cannot establish that he was prejudiced by any 
deficiency in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt presented at trial. 
Dixon was observed to be heavily intoxicated prior to attack, and was heard 
expressing plan to "go get [himself] a 12-year-old" (Trial Tr., p.280, L5 -
p.284, L.25.) K.G. identified Dixon as the attacker, both at the scene immediately 
after the incident and at trial. (Trial Tr., p.56, L 18 - p.57, L 12; p.60, Ls.9-14; 
p.201, L 18 - p.203, L 16.) Two bystanders, while not in a position to be able to 
see the lewd conduct act itself, corroborated much of K.G.'s account of the 
interaction with Dixon, and were able to identify him. (Trial Tr., p.96, L 14 -
105, L2; p.119, L4-p.123, g.) 
16 
is 
in of a ncn,,,,,,--
reviewed Dixon's records. .) 
fails his attempt to LR.C.P. 60(b) to 
ineffective assistance counsel claims were previously 
conviction not constitute "unique and compelling" 
B. Standard Of Review 
decision to deny or grant relief to a 60(b) is 
reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard." 
1 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 819, 822 (2006) (citing "':"":":':-'--'!:..'--'-!..:.==.:..:l..-!.:":'::::':"'''':''':' 
"":"':"':::':"':'::::"'==.l-!..!...:.=' 137 Idaho 747,753,53 P.3d 330, 336 (2002)). 
17 
C. 
LRC.P. 60(b) Motion 
"from a final judgment, or proceeding" for .. reason justifying relief 
from the operating of the judgment" \Nhile the language of LRC.P. 60(b)(6) is 
broad, the rule clearly defined Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 
793 P.2d 1263 (Ct 1990). party making an I. R C.P. 60(b )(6) motion 
must demonstrate and compelling" circumstances justifying relief. kL; 
148 Idaho 731, 736, 228 P.3d 998, 1003 (2010). An 
I.RC.P. 60(b)(6) motion cannot be a disguised substitute for a timely appeaL 
.!..-.::::.J::::.!..!.::::!.-!..:-!..-=~, 105 Idaho 669 P.2d 191 (1983). 
testified h is I. P. 60(b )(6) hearing and repeated much his 
trial testimony regarding the cause and nature of arm (#40761 R, 
pp.12-13.6) He also submitted an affidavit from a physical therapist who did not 
actually examine Dixon, but reviewed his medical records and concluded that at 
the time of the attack, Dixon "could not physically have lifted anything 
moderate/medium weight with his left upper extremity." (#40761 R, p.13; 
1/17/12 Affidavit (agumentation).) Dixon argued that his trial attorney "dropped 
the ball" by not presenting such medical evidence at the trial. (#40761 R, p.13.) 
5 Dixon also brought his motion pursuaht to I.RC.P. 60(b)(1) and (2). (10/5/11 
Motion (augmentation).) However, Dixon has pursued only the I.RC.P. 60(b)(6) 
component of his motion on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.) 
6 The appellate record appears to contain the minutes (#40761 R, pp.2-14), but 
not a transcript, of the hearing on Dixon's I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion. Missing 
portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the trial court. 
State v. Mowery, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333 (1996); State v. Beck, 128 
Idaho 416,422,913 P.2d 1186 (Ct. App. 1996). 
18 
c 
On ! Dixon relies on =:;:;..~-=..::= Court 
a a 
conviction proceeding over course of several years, ultimately In 
court's dismissal of the petition, constitute "unique and compelling" 
circumstances warranting relief from dismissal pursuant to LRC.P. 60(b)(6). 
148 Idaho at 736-738, 228 P.3d at 1003-1005. However, Eby has no 
application to the present case. Unlike Eby, Dixon had the opportunity, through 
counsel, to present his post-conviction claims to the district court. did not 
transform I RC.P. 60(b)(6) into an avenue for individuals to pursue ordinary 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that have already been rejected in 
post-conviction proceedings. 
Dixon also appears to assert, for the first time on appeal, that district 
should have granted his I.RC.P. 60(b)(6) motion on the that 
19 
post-conviction was ineffective. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.) However, 
did not make argument to district court in the course of 
I. C.P. 60(b)(6) (See #40761 12-14; 10/5/11 Motion 
(augmentation).) This Court should not consider this argument because Dixon 
failed to preserve it. 121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126. ("The 
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are 
presented for the first time on appeal."). In any event, the state asserts that 
assertions that post-conviction counsel inadequately raised a claim cannot 
generally constitute "unique and compelling" circumstances warranting I. R. C. P. 
60(b )(6) relief. 
Because he presented no and compelling" circumstances to the 
court which necessitated I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying his I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion. 
This Court should therefore affirm the district court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
denial of Dixon's petition for post-conviction relief, and its denial of his I.R.C.P. 
60(b )(6) motion. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2014 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
20 
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